Los instrumentos de deuda dependientes del estado

Recientemente, el portal web CEPR’s policy (VoxEU.org) ha publicado una serie de artículos sobre los instrumentos de deuda que dependen de los Estados. El siguiente post dedicado a estos artículos, será de sumo interés para los estudiosos del tema. Los artículos incluyen referencias actualizadas, antecedentes, estado actual del tema, un caso de estudio y aplicación en excel. Todo disponible en cuatro artículos, eso si, todo el material disponible esta en idioma inglés.

1. What history tells us about state-contingent debt instruments: The case for state-contingent debt instruments, linking contractual debt to a pre-defined variable, has been theorised but not developed. This column gives a historical perspective of the issuance of these instruments to alleviate liquidity and/or solvency pressures on the sovereign in ‘normal times’ and during restructurings. It also discusses the valuable lessons that inflation-linked bonds provide for development of the state-contingent debt instrument market.
2. State-contingent debt instruments for sovereigns: A balanced view. The theoretical benefits of state-contingent debt instruments for sovereigns – such as GDP-linked and extendible bonds – have been advocated by academics for several decades, but only recently have the practical constraints and considerations been explored in detail. This column summarises this more recent work, highlighting key findings on instrument design and on broader market development prospects.
3. The case for contingent convertible debt for sovereigns: Contingent debt has been gaining ground as a tool for banking stability. This column argues for the advantages of sovereign debt with a contingent payment standstill. Sovereign contingent debt would have instigated early responses for Eurozone crisis countries ranging from a couple of months (Ireland) to almost two years (Cyprus). Pricing simulations illustrate how this financial innovation creates appropriate incentives for sovereigns and addresses creditor moral hazard. Using contingent debt for Greece, we illustrate that the country’s debt profile can improve significantly.
4. Simulating the impact of state-contingent debt instruments on sovereign finances: An Excel toolkit. State-contingent debt instruments could provide sovereigns with additional policy space in bad states of the world. This column presents an Excel-based tool that allows debt managers and investors to explore the impact of different designs of such instruments on public debt and gross financing needs under user-specified macroeconomic scenarios (both baseline and shocks). Illustrative results show the potential benefits of different bond designs on both debt and gross financing needs.